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Fixing Enforcement and Due Process 
Will Not Fix What Is Wrong with the 
NCAA 
Donna A. Lopiano, Ph.D.* 
When I was asked to contribute an article to the Roger 
Williams University Law Review Symposium Edition on fixing the 
due process and enforcement rules and regulations of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), I immediately 
responded with a counterproposal.  I requested permission to 
explore why so much more than investigatory, adjudication, and 
enforcement processes need to be fixed; why the NCAA has been 
incapable of significant reform; and the conditions under which 
truly educational reform might occur.  Enforcement and due 
process are important, but constitute such a small part of what is 
wrong with the NCAA, including: weak eligibility regulations that 
permit exploitation of academically underprepared athletes 
(especially those who are admitted without meeting normal 
admissions standards), lack of tenured faculty oversight of athlete 
academic practices (enrollment in easy majors and classes and 
suspect tutor support administered by the athletic department), 
lack of whistle-blower protection to protect athletes or faculty who 
report rules violations or mistreatment, disproportionate salaries 
for coaches and athletic directors, expensive and excessively lavish 
facilities available only to athletes, high student fees used to 
 
* President and founder of Sports Management Resources, a consulting firm; 
adjunct instructor of Sports Management at Southern Connecticut State 
University.  Lopiano earned her master’s and doctoral degrees from the 
University of Southern California and her bachelor’s degree from Southern 
Connecticut State University. 
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support athletics, athletes putting in more hours at practice and 
competing than studying to pass their courses, and more. 
My premises are simple: (1) the members of the NCAA have 
lost control of the commercialism of Division I (“D-I”) athletics due 
to changes it allowed in the NCAA governance structure that gave 
legislative control to the institutions with the most 
commercialized athletic programs; (2) the blame for increasingly 
unregulated and commercialized Division I athletics is a direct 
result of a small number of the most powerful and successful 
athletic programs bullying a much larger NCAA membership to 
succumb to their legislative wishes by threatening to leave the 
organization, thereby removing the NCAA’s primary funding 
source; and (3) given the current Division I Football Bowl 
Subdivision controlled structure of the NCAA, only action by 
Congress using the penalties of higher education institutions’ loss 
of federal Higher Education Act funding or tax preferences and 
the incentive of a limited antitrust exemption can produce 
sustainable reform. 
I. THE COMPOSITION OF THE NCAA MEMBERSHIP 
In order to fully comprehend how a small minority of highly 
commercialized athletic programs are being allowed to engage in 
highly questionable activities, it is important to first understand 
the composition of the NCAA membership and the huge financial 
differences among members of various competitive divisions, as 
well as to dispel the myth of self-supporting athletic programs.  
The NCAA is a not-for-profit organization governed by its member 
institutions and conferences.1  In 2012–13, there were 1,076 four-
year institutions that were active voting members and an 
additional 26 members categorized as provisional or candidate 
non-voting members.2  Ninety-seven of 141 conference members 
had voting rights, and there were 37 affiliated non-member 
 
 1.  See Frequently-Asked Questions About the NCAA, NCAA, http:// 
www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa (last visited Jan. 
3, 2015). 
 2.  Composition and Sports Sponsorship of the Membership: 2012–2013 
Composition, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/ 
composition-and-sport-sponsorship-membership (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) 
[hereinafter Composition of Membership]. 
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organizations.3  Of the 1,076 active member institutions, 346 were 
members of Division I, the highest competitive division; 291 were 
members of Division II (“D-II”), which is mandated to offer fewer 
scholarships and impose other athletic program operations 
restrictions compared to Division I; and 439 were members of 
Division III (“D-III”), the non-scholarship division.4  The 
philosophy of Division I is openly “commercial,” in that these 
institutions seek to maximize athletic program generated 
revenues in order to have their athletic programs pay for 
themselves.5  In addition to serving the student-athlete, Division I 
programs seek to provide a larger institutional audience (faculty, 
staff, student), as well as the general public,6 with an 
entertainment product that enhances the affinity of these 
audiences with the educational institution. 
Only 100 Division I members do not sponsor football (e.g., 
Marquette, St. John’s, DePaul, and Georgetown).7  The remaining 
246 Division I members are divided into two subdivisions for the 
sport of football, the Football Championship Subdivision (“FCS”) 
(e.g., Grambling State, Missouri State, Illinois State, Cornell, and 
University of Delaware) with 126 members and the Football Bowl 
Subdivision (“FBS”) (e.g., University of Texas, Ohio State 
University, University of Alabama, and University of Southern 
California) with 120 members.8  FBS institutions sponsor higher-
 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  See Gary T. Brown, Division I self-sufficiency expected—but most 
often not realized, NCAA NEWS (Aug. 29, 2005, 1:24 PM), http:// 
fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/2005/Division+I/division%2Bi%2Bself-su
fficiency%2Bexpected%2B-%2Bbut%2Bmost%2Boften%2Bnot%2Brealized%2
B-%2B8-29-05%2Bncaa%2Bnews.html. 
 6.   See NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 20.9.2(c)), at 347 
(2014), [hereinafter D-1 MANUAL] available at http://www.ncaa 
publications.com/productdownloads/ D115.pdf. 
 7.  Composition of Membership, supra note 2. 
 8.  Id.  From the inception of the NCAA in 1906 through 1955, there 
were no separate membership divisions representing different levels of 
competition.  See Brian D. Shannon & Jo Potuto, Presentation at the Division 
I-A Faculty Representative Annual Meeting on NCAA Governance: Now & In 
the Future 8 (Sep. 22, 2013), available at http://www.cbssports.com/ 
images/collegefootball/NCAA-Governance-FAR.pdf.  From 1956 to 1972, there 
were two divisions: college (smaller schools) and university.  Id.  In 1973, the 
NCAA adopted the current three-division structure and, in 1978, split 
Division I into the current FBS,  FCS, and non-football subdivisions.  Id. 
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budget athletic programs and are committed to competing in 
basketball and football “at the highest feasible level of 
intercollegiate competition.”9  All FBS members sponsor spectator-
oriented, revenue-producing basketball programs, and 246 
sponsor spectator-oriented, revenue-producing football 
programs.10  FBS athletic programs must also meet minimum 
requirements in four areas: (1) sports sponsorship (must sponsor 
at least 16 NCAA championship sports including football, with 
each sport also meeting participant and regular season contest 
criteria minimums in order to count against the sponsorship 
standard); (2) scheduling (must play at least 60% of their football 
schedules, at least 5 home contests against other FBS members, 
all but four men’s and women’s basketball games against Division 
I opponents, and 50% of contests in other sports against Division I 
opponents); (3) attendance at football games (must average 15,000 
people in actual or paid attendance per home game over a rolling 
two-year period); and (4) scholarship allocations (must award 90% 
of the maximum number of football scholarships allowed and 200 
grant-in-aids, or $4 million in total scholarship expenditures).11  
Total operating expenses at FBS institutions range from $11.4 to 
$146.8 million.12 
Notably, in 2013, only 20 Division I programs—all FBS 
institutions, but representing only 1.9% of all NCAA active 
members and 16% of FBS—actually produced more revenues than 
they spent.13  Operating losses of the remaining institutions 
 
 9.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 20.9.2(e), at 347. 
 10.   Composition of Membership, supra note 2.  See also D-1 MANUAL, 
supra note 6, art. 20.9.2(e), at 347 (“A member of Division I . . . [s]ponsors at 
the highest feasible level of intercollegiate competition one or both of the 
traditional spectator-oriented, income-producing sports of football and 
basketball.” (emphasis added)). 
 11.   D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 20.9.9, at 353–54. 
 12.   NCAA, NCAA DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS 
REPORT: 2004 – 2013 REVENUES & EXPENSES 45 (compiled by Daniel L. Fulks, 
2014) [hereinafter D-1 REVENUES & EXPENSES REPORT] (contains data for 
fiscal years 2004–2013), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/ 
productdownloads/D1REVEXP2013.pdf. 
 13.   Id. at 8.  Revenues for this calculation exclude institutional 
subsidies (such as transfers from the institution’s general fund and mandated 
student fees allocated to support athletics), capital costs, and debt service 
expenditures. 
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ranged from a high of $49 million to a low of $256,00014 with a 
median of $11.6 million, representing a 2% increase over the 
previous year.15  The overt expression of a commercial and 
entertainment sport philosophy—commemorated in the NCAA 
rules manual—and the practice of excessive spending has fueled 
an FBS arms race and a system of student-athlete exploitation, 
which serves as the primary focus of this Article. 
NCAA FCS teams have somewhat lower competitive 
subdivision criteria than the FBS and lack a football game 
attendance requirement.  FCS institution athletic programs must 
meet minimum requirements in the areas of: (1) sports 
sponsorship (must sponsor at least 14 NCAA championship sports 
including football, with each sport also meeting participant and 
regular season contest criteria minimums in order to count 
against the sponsorship standard); (2) scheduling (must play at 
least 50% of regular season football contests against FBS or FCS 
members, all but four men’s and women’s basketball games 
against Division I opponents, and 50% of contests in other sports 
against Division I opponents); and (3) scholarship allocations 
(lower number of scholarships allowed in football).16  The athletic 
program annual budgets for these institutions range from $4.4 to 
$42.2 million.17  The financial status of these institutions is 
significantly more precarious than FBS institutions.  No 
institution generates more revenues than it spends.18  They are 
heavily subsidized by institutional allocations (71% of total 
operating budgets).19  Median operating losses of $10.8 million 
represent an 83% increase since 2004,20 with losses ranging from 
a high of $32.8 million to a low of $2.8 million.21 
The 100 non-football playing Division I institutions must 
meet minimum requirements in three areas as well: (1) sports 
sponsorship (must sponsor at least 14 NCAA championship sports 
including football, with each sport also meeting participant and 
 
 14.   Id. at 47. 
 15.   Id. at 12. 
 16.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, arts. 15.5.6.2, 20.9.7.1, 20.9.8.1, 20.9.10, 
at 202, 352, 355. 
 17.  D-1 REVENUES & EXPENSES REPORT, supra note 12, at 70. 
 18.  Id. at 14. 
 19.  Id. at 8.   
 20.  Id. at 13. 
 21.  Id. at 72. 
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regular season contest criteria minimums in order to count 
against the sponsorship standard); (2) scheduling (must play all 
but four basketball contests against other Division I opponents 
and at least 50% of their schedules in other sports against 
Division I opponents); and (3) scholarship allocations (must award 
a minimum of 50% of the maximum allowable grants in 14 sports, 
an equivalent number of full scholarships, or an equivalent 
amount in aggregated total scholarship expenditures).22  Total 
operating budgets of these schools range from $3.7 to $35.8 
million.23 
The financial status of these institutions is as precarious as 
FCS institutions, if not more so, despite having significantly 
smaller operating budgets.  Like FCS institutions, none of these 
institutions operate at a profit either.24  They are heavily 
subsidized by institutional allocations (77% of total operating 
budgets).25  Median operating losses in 2013 were $10.7 million, 
ranging from a high of $31.2 million to a low of $2.8 million.26 
Key to understanding the financial relationships between the 
three Division I subdivisions is that they are all engaged in 
recruiting the same elite level athletes, except that the FCS has 
accepted its second class position in football.  Thus, the so called 
“arms race” affects all member institutions.  If lavish locker 
rooms, computer centers exclusively for athletes, and other special 
benefits are provided by FBS institutions, the rest of the 
subdivisions are then pressured to match these investments.  
Particularly important to all Division I members is access to the 
68 team, Division I national men’s basketball championship, 
commonly referred to as “March Madness” or the “Final Four.”  
The one-loss-and-out nature of this championship makes 
“Cinderella” teams possible, and as detailed later, the significant 
largess of the media rights associated with the tournament gets 
returned to all Division I member institutions.  Even within the 
FBS, there is segmentation between the 65 institutions 
comprising the so-called “Big Five” conferences,27 which consist of 
 
 22.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, arts. 20.9.3, .6–8, at 348–49, 352. 
 23.  D-1 REVENUES & EXPENSES REPORT, supra note 12, at 95.  
 24.  Id. at 14. 
 25.  Id. at 8. 
 26.  Id. at 96. 
 27.  The “Big Five” conferences include the Atlantic Coast Conference 
LOPIANOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015  11:09 AM 
256 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:250 
the richest athletic programs, as well as the other 60 institutions 
in the FBS.  Thus, recruiting, financial aid, and other rules that 
result in differing treatment of athletes within the subdivisions 
affect the financial integrity of the entire Division I system. 
In contrast to the Division I philosophy, Divisions II and III 
make no mention of maximizing athletic program revenues.  
Division II centers its philosophical statement on the role of 
athletics, athlete “growth opportunities through academic 
achievement, learning in high-level athletics competition and 
development of positive societal attitudes in service to community.  
The balance and integration of these different areas of learning 
provide Division II student-athletes a path to graduation while 
cultivating a variety of skills and knowledge for life ahead.”28  
Division II institution athletic programs must meet minimum 
requirements in only two areas: (1) sports sponsorship (must 
sponsor at least 10 NCAA championship sports with one sport in 
each of three sport seasons, with each sport also meeting 
participant and regular season contest criteria minimums in order 
to count against the sponsorship standard) and (2) scholarship 
allocations (have lower limits on the number of scholarships that 
can be awarded in each sport and, generally, must award the 
equivalent of 50% of these lower maximum limits).29  Total 
operating expenses at Division II institutions with football range 
from $1.8 to $13.3 million, with fewer than 10% of these programs 
spending over $10 million.30  Division II institutions without 
 
(“ACC”), the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”), the Big 12 Conference, the 
Big Ten Conference, and the Pacific-12 Conference (“Pac-12”).  See Kent 
Babb, NCAA board of directors approves autonomy for ‘Big Five’ conference 
schools, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/ 
colleges/ncaa-board-of-directors-approves-autonomy-for-big-5-conference-scho
ols/2014/08/07/807882b4-1e58-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story.html. 
 28.  Division II Strategic Positioning Platform, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/division-ii-strategic-positioning-
platform (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
 29.  NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL art. 20.10.2, at 305–06 
(2014) [hereinafter D-II MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaa 
publications.com/productdownloads/D215.pdf.  
 30.  NCAA, NCAA DIVISION II INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS 
REPORT: 2004–2013 REVENUES & EXPENSES 42 (compiled by Daniel L. Fulks, 
2014) (contains data for fiscal years 2004–2013), available at http://www. 
ncaapublications.com/p-4345-division-ii-revenues-and-expenses-20042013.asp
x?CategoryID=0&SectionID=0&ManufacturerID=0&DistributorID=0&Genre
ID=0& VectorID=0&. 
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football programs have operating budgets ranging from $709,400 
to $16.9 million.31  These programs are almost entirely supported 
by institutional allocations.32  The median athletic program 
generated revenue for institutions with football is $640,00033 and 
$336,000 for programs without football.34 
Division III athletic programs, 
place highest priority on the overall quality of the 
educational experience and on the successful completion 
of all students’ academic programs.  They seek to 
establish and maintain an environment in which a 
student-athlete’s athletic activities are conducted as an 
integral part of the student-athlete’s educational 
experience, and in which coaches play a significant role as 
educators.35 
The Division’s central qualifying premise is not providing any 
“award of financial aid to any student on the basis of athletics 
leadership, ability, participation or performance.”36  In addition to 
the prohibition of athletic-based financial aid, the only other 
membership criteria is sports sponsorship based on the size of the 
institution—institutions with enrollments of 1,000 or fewer must 
have 10 NCAA championship sports, and institutions with greater 
than 1,000 students must have at least 12 NCAA championship 
sports.37  Total operating expenses at Division III institutions 
with football programs range from $784,800 to $14.1 million, with 
fewer than 10% of these programs spending over $7 million.38  
 
 31.  Id. at 67. 
 32.  Id. at 6.  Institutional allocations fund 88% of athletic programs with 
football and 93% of those without football.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 11. 
 34.  Id. at 12. 
 35.  NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL art. 20.11, at 187 (2014) 
[hereinafter D-III MANUAL], available at  http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-
4357-2014-2015-ncaa-division-iii-manual-august-version.aspx?CategoryID=0 
&SectionID=0&ManufacturerID=0&DistributorID=0&GenreID=0&VectorID
=0&.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 188. 
 38.  NCAA, NCAA DIVISION III INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS 
REPORT: 2004 – 2013 REVENUES AND EXPENSES 31 (compiled by Daniel L. 
Fulks, 2014) (contains data for fiscal years 2004–2013), available at http:// 
www.ncaapublications.com/p-4348-division-iii-revenues-and-expenses-2004-2
013.aspx?CategoryID=0&SectionID=0&ManufacturerID=0&DistributorID=0
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Athletic budgets at institutions without football programs range 
from $421,600 to $9.2 million, with fewer than 10% of these 
programs spending over $4.5 million.39  Like Division II but even 
more so, the bulk of these programs are funded through 
institutional allocations.40  The NCAA does not gather data on 
revenues produced in this division. 
II. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DIVISION I SELF-INTEREST 
The institutionalization of Division I FBS self-interest, and 
now particularly the 65 institutions of the Big Five conferences  
which have legislative autonomy, is all about keeping as much 
national championship and other non-regular season and non-
conference championship revenue as possible for themselves.  
Thus, it is important to understand the sources of this national 
championship revenue, how it is distributed, and who determines 
the distribution.  The NCAA makes most of its money by owning 
and selling marketing rights to its national championships; most 
of the remainder derives from national championship gate 
receipts.41  The NCAA currently sponsors 89 championships in 23 
sports.42  Some of these post-season tournaments are restricted to 
competitive division members and some are “open” to teams from 
any member institution.43  The bulk of current NCAA revenues is 
derived from the 68-team, single elimination, Division I national 
basketball championship, branded as “March Madness,” which 
culminates in a four-team championship playoff weekend, the 
“Final Four.”44  This property generates approximately $770 
million annually in NCAA media rights fees, gate receipts, and 
 
&GenreID=0& VectorID=0&.  
 39.  Id. at 46. 
 40.  Id. at 10. 
 41.  See infra Table 1. 
 42.  See Finances, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2015) [hereinafter NCAA Finances]. 
 43.  Open championships include women’s bowling, men’s and women’s 
fencing, men’s and women’s gymnastics, women’s ice hockey, men’s and 
women’s rifle, men’s and women’s skiing, men’s volleyball, and men’s and 
women’s water polo.  See D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 20.8.1, at 346. 
 44.  See Mark Alesia, NCAA Approaching $1 Billion Per Year Amid 
Challenges by Players, INDYSTAR (Mar. 27, 2014, 11:06 PM), 
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2014/03/27/ncaa-approaching-billion-per-
year-amid-challenges-players/6973767/.   
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sponsorships.45  From 2012–13, 84% of the NCAA’s total revenues 
of $912 million were derived from March Madness.46 
TABLE I.  NCAA Revenues for the Year ending August 31, 201347 
Championship Television and marketing rights fees $726,391,860 
Championships and NIT tournaments gate receipts/ 
sponsorships 
$110,631,867 
Investment income $41,398,750 
Sales and services $27,307,562 
Contributions-facilities net $7,074,007 
TOTAL $912,804,046 
A small percentage of that revenue is used to operate the 
NCAA’s national office, including the operation of championship 
events.48  But in the end, more than 90 cents of every dollar the 
NCAA generates is returned to member institutions either for 
specified purposes to support student-athletes or unrestricted in 
the case of revenues distributed based on Division I basketball 
championship participation.49 
TABLE 2.  NCAA Expenses for the Year ending August 31, 201350 
Revenues  Expenses   % of 
Distribution to Division I members  $527,432,377  58% 
Division I championships, programs, NIT 
tournament 
$97,407,498 11% 
Division II championships, distribution, and 
programs 
$35,650,808  4% 
Division III championships and programs $27,531,406 3% 
Association wide programs $122,244,138 13% 
Management and general $41,785,827   5% 
TOTAL $852,052,054*  
*$60,751,992 difference from total revenues represents funds 
invested/reserves (6% of revenues) 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id.; see also NCAA AND SUBSIDIARIES, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ 
REPORT & CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 4 (2013) [hereinafter NCAA 
AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS], available at http://www.ncaa.org/ 
sites/default/files/NCAA_FS_2012-13_V1%20DOC1006715.pdf. 
 47.  NCAA AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 46, at 4.  
 48.  See infra Table 2. 
 49.  NCAA Finances, supra note 42. 
 50.  NCAA AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 46, at 4.  
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The Division I revenue distribution to member institutions is 
for the following specified purposes: basketball fund (39%), 
student-athlete athletic grants in aid (26%), special student 
assistance (15%), sports sponsorship (13%), academic 
enhancement (5%), conference grants (2%), and supplemental 
support (>1%).51  The basketball fund is a pay-off system to 
conferences based on the finish of their teams in the Final Four 
over a six-year rolling period.52  The conferences subsequently 
determine how to distribute this money among their member 
institutions.53  To its credit, the NCAA has significantly reduced 
the amount of distribution that is based on winning post-season 
basketball games and increased amounts dedicated to reimbursing 
institutions for their athletic program expenditures on important 
student-athlete benefits, such academic support programs, 
scholarships, and sport operating costs.54  However, the $100 
million portion based on basketball tournament participation is 
still very substantial.  The non-basketball fund distributions are 
fixed amounts in some cases, such as for academic enhancement 
(same amount to each Division I member), and based on program 
size in other cases, as is the case for sport sponsorship and 
scholarships dedicated distributions.55 
The bottom line of this explanation is that the NCAA has 
established a revenue distribution system that is dominated by 
the philosophy of returning the most money to the members 
responsible for earning that money, a for-profit business 
mentality, rather than acting as a non-profit association.  The 
NCAA, a non-profit organization, owns its national 
championships.  The revenues derived from these championships 
 
 51.  NCAA, 2013–14 DIVISION I REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 3 (2014) 
[hereinafter D-1 REVENUE DISTRIBUTION], available at  http://www.ncaa.org/ 
sites/default/files/2013-14%20Revenue%20Distribution%20Plan.pdf. 
 52.  Id. at 7, 8. 
 53.  Id. at 8. 
 54.  Prior to 1991, NCAA Final Four revenues were distributed among 
only those teams that participated in the Final Four.  See Distributions, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/distributions (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2015).  In 1991, broad-based distributions to all Division I 
institutions were initiated to help support academic, scholarship, and 
operating expenses.  Id. 
 55.  D-1 REVENUE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 51, at 10. 
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should be used to best advance the mission of the organization, 
benefitting all of its members and all student-athletes, not just 
the athletes participating in commercialized programs.  The 
NCAA has not adopted the non-profit philosophical position—for 
instance, that all national Association revenues should be used in 
a way that contributes to the education, health, and welfare of the 
greatest number of student-athletes.  Institutions with 
commercialized athletic programs earn significant revenues from 
their own regular season contests and shares of conference 
championships.  National championships revenues should assist 
all NCAA member institutions, just as conference championship 
revenues are split among all conference members. 
Notably, the NCAA does not sponsor a FBS football 
championship.  The College Football Playoff, a four-team play-off 
accepted by the public as the FBS national championship, begins 
in the fall of 201456 and is the sequel to the Bowl Championship 
Series and its two-team championship, which existed from 1998 
through 2013.57  The value of the new four-team College Football 
Playoff is approximately $470 million per year, and it is owned 
jointly by all FBS conferences plus Notre Dame, rather than the 
NCAA.58  These College Football Playoff proceeds are not equally 
shared among all FBS members.  The 65 Big Five conference 
members take home 75% of the proceeds, and the remaining 25% 
is distributed to the 60 remaining institutions via other FBS 
conferences.59  The NCAA FCS championship is a 16-team 
tournament.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that it is only a 
matter of time before the College Football Playoff is expanded to 
eight teams or more, which would most likely increase its 
approximate value to more than $1 billion per year. 
The fact that almost half of all NCAA revenues and 75% of all 
College Football Playoff revenues go to the Big Five conferences 
 
 56.  See Chronology, COLL. FOOTBALL PLAYOFF, http://www.collegefootball 
playoff.com/chronology (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Chronology]. 
 57.  See Richard Billingsley, The road to the BCS has been a long one, 
ESPN, http://assets.espn.go.com/ncf/s/historybcs.html (last updated Oct. 22, 
2014, 12:45 PM). 
 58.  See George Schroeder, Power Five’s College Football Playoff revenues 
will double what BCS paid, USA TODAY (July 16, 2014, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/07/16/college-football-playof 
f-financial-revenues-money-distribution-bill-hancock/127344897/.   
 59.  See id. 
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reveals the source code of highly commercialized and 
educationally questionable Division I football and basketball 
programs.  These conferences have intentionally acted to control 
NCAA distributions and keep most of the revenues from the 
College Football Playoffs for themselves.  The goal of the 65 Big 
Five conference institutions is clear; they want to win and will 
spend whatever it takes to win, all while maintaining a resource 
advantage over 94% of all other NCAA member institutions. 
Until 1997, the NCAA generally operated as a one-
institution/one-vote association.60  Members convened annually in 
a deliberative assembly requiring a two-thirds vote to adopt 
legislation that was constitutional in importance and voting as a 
whole or by Division (generally by majority vote) on legislation of 
lesser importance.61  In 1997, Division I moved from a one-
institution/one-vote assembly to a conference based Legislative 
Council, subject to review by a Division I Board of Directors.62  
Concomitant with this separation from Division II and III in 1997, 
using the threat of FBS institutions leaving the NCAA, FBS 
schools were successful in accomplishing three goals key to 
perpetuating the competitive dominance of the Big Five 
conferences: (1) getting NCAA members to agree to a federated 
structure—which gave more autonomy to each division but gave 
FBS 50% of all voting positions on the NCAA Executive 
Committee (the governance structure that has final authority over 
the Association’s budget and the power to call for a two-thirds vote 
of the entire membership to overturn the action of any division or 
subdivision) and 61% control of the Division I Board of 
Directors;63 (2) passage of a legislative provision approved by the 
entire NCAA membership that relegated Division II and Division 
III’s share of NCAA national championship and organization 
revenues to no more than 8 to 11% and gave Division I control of 
the remaining lion’s share of the NCAA’s revenue distribution;64 
and (3) specifying that if any new NCAA subdivision 
 
 60.  See Allie Grasgreen, Division I Divisiveness, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/02/16/ncaa-governance-
brink-reform. 
 61.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 4.6.4, at 23. 
 62.  See id. art. 4.6, at 23–24.  
 63.  Id. arts. 4.1–4.2.2, at 20–21. 
 64.  Id. arts. 4.01.2, 4.01.2.2.2.3, at 17. 
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championship was initiated (practically meaning an FBS national 
championship), all of its revenue belonged to and would be under 
the control of that subdivision.65 
These actions fully protected the revenues from the then-new 
football Bowl Championship Series (the predecessor to the current 
College Football Playoff National Championship), a property not 
owned by the NCAA that was about to launch.66  Even if the 
NCAA started an NCAA FBS national championship in the 
future, the FBS institutions would not share these NCAA 
revenues with other NCAA members, and the FBS would 
determine any such distribution among FBS institutions.67  
However, given FBS control of the NCAA’s primary legislative 
mechanisms, it is highly unlikely that the FBS would permit the 
development of a competing product to its College Football 
Playoffs.  The institutionalization of this plutocracy—giving voting 
control to a minority of the wealthiest athletic programs—is 
without precedent in either amateur or professional sports 
worldwide. 
The financial support of Division II and III legislation 
actually reads, “[m]embers are guaranteed revenue through 
allocations made to each division from the Association’s general 
operating revenue.  Division II shall receive at least 4.37 percent 
of the Association’s annual general operating revenue.  Division 
III shall receive at least 3.18 percent of the Association’s annual 
general operating revenue.”68  The use of “at least” was 
disingenuous.  In most years, Division II and III (68% of NCAA 
active members) receive 8% to 11% of NCAA distributions.69  In 
 
 65.  Id. art. 4.01.2.2.1, at 17.  
 66.  See BCS governance, BCS BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, 
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809846 (last updated Mar. 27, 
2014, 7:04 PM).  Following the adoption of this NCAA legislation in 1997, it 
was no accident that in 1998 the FBS conferences created the Bowl 
Championship Series (“BCS”) with five bowl games among the top 10 teams.  
See Billingsley, supra note 57.  In 2006, the FBS conferences added a #1 vs. 
#2 national championship game the week after New Year’s, effectively 
starting their own national championship.  See id.  The BCS was the 
predecessor to the four-team FBS College Football Playoff, which began in 
the fall of 2014.  See Chronology, supra note 56. 
 67.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 4.01.2.2, at 17. 
 68.  Id. art. 4.01.2.1, at 17.  
 69.  NCAA, MEMBERSHIP REPORT 19 (2006), available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/web_video/membership_report/2008/content/p
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contrast, members of Division I (32% of NCAA active members70) 
received 69%71 of 2012–13 NCAA revenues, and members of the 
Big Five conferences (6% of NCAA members) received 31% of the 
Division I distributions.72  The likely intent of the legislation was 
to make clear to the rest of the membership that Division I-earned 
revenues would stay with Division I, and Division II and III 
should not expect support beyond the payment of expenses for 
their teams to participate in NCAA national championships and 
the benefits of limited association wide programs, such as 
providing catastrophic insurance for all NCAA athletes. 
The Big Five conferences achieved further restructure of the 
NCAA that gave them even greater legislative autonomy in 
2014.73  They claim that with such autonomy, they will use 
revenues from the College Football Playoff to enhance athletes’ 
welfare by providing athletic scholarships covering the full cost of 
college attendance and lifelong scholarship support for former 
athletes wishing to complete undergraduate degrees74—both of 
which were legislative provisions previously rejected by the 
NCAA.75  However, that claim is disingenuous because it gives the 
impression that only Big Five conference institutions have the 
financial ability to provide such benefits.  For instance, the Big 
Five conferences have not proposed that the NCAA, rather than 
the FBS, own the College Football Playoff in the same way the 
NCAA owns the Final Four basketball and all other national 
championships, thereby creating the funding source to provide 
such expanded scholarship support to all Division I athletes.  
Instead, the Big Five seeks to enhance their existing advantage by 
providing only their athletes with benefits that members of other 
 
df/2006_NCAA_Membership_Report.pdf. 
 70.  NCAA AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 46, at 4.  The 
remaining funds are for association-wide programs and management 
expenses not broken down by division.  Id. at 4; see also Composition of 
Membership, supra note 2. 
 71.   NCAA AUDIT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 46, at 4.   
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See Brian Bennett, NCAA board votes to allow autonomy, ESPN 
(Aug. 8, 2014, 1:22 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321 
551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy-five-power-conferences.  
 74.  See id.  Not all college athletes are on “full” scholarships; however, 
the highest percentage of athletes on full scholarships are in Division I 
basketball and football.  See id. 
 75.  See id. 
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FBS or Division I conferences cannot match due to more limited 
financial resources.  It is clear that the overriding goal of the Big 
Five conferences is to keep as much revenue as they can so they 
gain the greatest advantage in being able to attract prospective 
student-athletes, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will 
win football and basketball games.  In short, these institutions 
will spend as much as they can earn to achieve athletic 
dominance. 
III. THE THREAT OF FBS OR BIG FIVE DEPARTURE FROM THE NCAA 
Given the aforementioned restructure of the NCAA to give the 
FBS full license to act in its own self-interest, educators and the 
public should ask why non-FBS NCAA members do not unite to 
oppose such a governance imbalance, or why the membership 
allowed this in the first place.  The answer is that the FBS, and 
now most recently, the Big Five conference institutions, 
threatened to leave the NCAA if the other divisions or 
subdivisions did not give them what they wanted.76  The 
implication of this threat was, and is, that without these top 
revenue-producing FBS institutions, Division II and III 
institutions would not receive their current benefits, including 
fully paid travel, hotel, and meals for those athletes and coaches 
participating in NCAA championships, catastrophic injury 
insurance for all student-athletes, and the benefits of other NCAA 
association-wide programs.  In addition, the non-FBS members of 
Division I fear that a pullout by the FBS institutions would 
undermine the value of the Division I Basketball Final Four, 
which is their most significant revenue source. 
But what would actually happen if the FBS or the Big Five 
conference institutions pulled out of the NCAA? Is this really a 
viable threat, or is it an empty one?  It seems reasonable to 
 
 76.  See Tim Tucker, Slive threatens move to ‘Division 4’ if autonomy isn’t 
approved, ATLANTA J. CONST. (May 30, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://www. 
ajc.com/news/sports/college/slive-threatens-move-to-division-4-if-autonomy-
isn/nf9xH/#__federated=1.  Choosing to leave the NCAA or becoming a 
member of Division IV result in the same outcome because of the regulations 
implemented in 1997 that allow new subdivisions to keep their revenues.  
The practical effect of leaving the NCAA and becoming Division IV would be 
to undermine the NCAA Final Four basketball championship revenue 
distribution and all Division I institutions.   
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assume that such a departure is unlikely for three reasons.  First, 
given the number of collegiate institutions that would be 
negatively affected by such a move, it is reasonable to assume that 
those institutions would pressure their congressional 
representatives to act to stop such a possibility.  In such case, 
Congress could use either withdrawal of its substantial athletic 
program tax preferences or institutional non-qualification for 
Higher Education Act funding to dissuade such a move.  Such 
congressional actions would financially cripple the FBS athletic 
programs and their larger institutional hosts, and the threat of 
such action would probably be enough to deter their departure. 
Second, the most commercialized athletic programs need the 
philosophical protection of the significantly larger number of 
Division II and III athletic programs that allows the NCAA to 
defend itself in court against antitrust suits, positioning that their 
members conduct educational sport programs in which 
amateurism is a critical element.  These notions of Division I 
football and basketball programs being educational rather than 
professional sport operations are currently being attacked by a 
number of antitrust lawsuits.77  Also, a recent ruling by the 
regional office of the National Labor Relations Board on the 
request of Northwestern University football players to unionize 
classified these players as employees.78  However, the courts have, 
at least up to the date of publication of this Article, largely 
supported the NCAA’s position in most cases.79  Even the recent 
ruling in the O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, while 
undermining the NCAA’s definition of amateurism, acknowledges 
the need to keep compensation of student-athletes within the 
range of federal, student financial aid maximum limits, plus 
modest additional financial aid from group licensing fees.80  
 
 77.  See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In 
re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2541, 2014 WL 
2547809 (J.P.M.L. June 4, 2014) (consolidating Alston v. NCAA, No. 4:14-
01011 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2014) and Jenkins v. NCAA, No. 3:14-01678 (D.N.J. 
June 18, 2014)).   
 78.  Nw. Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1922054, at *22–24 
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014). 
 79.  See, e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack 
v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Hennessy v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 
(5th Cir. 1977); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).  
 80.  See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. 
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Because they control the bulk of media rights revenues, if the FBS 
or the Big Five conferences were to depart, they would find 
themselves in the crosshairs of these lawsuits and unionization 
efforts and, arguably, much weaker with regard to an educational-
sport defense. 
Third, it is unlikely that college presidents would allow their 
institutions to depart from the NCAA.  Most college presidents 
agree that they cannot control their athletic programs.81  
Presidents of institutions and athletic directors who are perceived 
to be acting in ways that make their athletic teams less 
competitive put their jobs in jeopardy.  It only takes one powerful 
donor, trustee, or legislator to raise the guillotine.  It appears 
reasonable to assume that college presidents would recognize that 
creating an independent, national governance association 
consisting of only the most commercialized athletic programs 
would exacerbate current problems and result in further loss of 
presidential control. 
IV. IS REFORM POSSIBLE? 
It is clear that the NCAA in general and Division I in 
particular are incapable of major reform because of the previously 
described institutionalization of FBS legislative self-interest at 
both the organizational and Division I governance levels.  
Depending on the FBS to navigate the return to a student-
centered focus runs counter to a history deeply devoted to 
pursuing commercial, sport revenue outcomes.  The current lack of 
appetite for non-FBS NCAA members to rise in opposition to 
recent FBS proposals for more legislative autonomy and power 
appears to reflect an environment of resignation.  NCAA members 
will most likely go along with continued FBS efforts to solidify a 
plutocracy.82  Thus, it is unrealistic to imagine that this wealthy, 
 
 81.  See KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, 
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH WITH FOOTBALL BOWL SUBDIVISION 
UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS ON THE COSTS AND FINANCING OF INTERCOLLEGIATE 
ATHLETICS, REPORT OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS § 3(A), at 7 (2009) 
[hereinafter KNIGHT COMM.].   
 82.  See Bob Kustra, NCAA Reforms a Subterfuge for Fueling the Arms 
Race in Intercollegiate Athletic Spending, CBS SPORTS, http://www. 
cbssports.com/images/collegefootball/Bob-Kustra-Boise-State-Division-I-NCA 
A-Reform.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
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ruling class will voluntarily give up power. 
Therefore, in the author’s view, there are only two realistic 
possibilities for changing course,  one a consequence of the courts 
and the National Labor Relations Board classifying college 
football and basketball players as professional athletes, and the 
other a proactive return to sports as bona fide, higher-education, 
extracurricular activities appropriate for a non-profit, educational 
enterprise.  The former possibility is that the NCAA Division I 
financial model of not paying athletes gets blown up by the 
current spate of antitrust suits still outstanding.  If the athletes 
who are currently involved in the litigation win, Division I 
institutions would face a tsunami-like financial catastrophe.  The 
current system is based on non-taxable student scholarships, 
rather than payment to employees.  A collegiate-professional sport 
model based on paying student-athletes as employees in an open 
marketplace would put the current institutional funding model at 
incredible risk. 
The current financial system is demonstrably unstable.  As 
previously stated, in 2012–13, only 20 institutions were making 
more than they spent.83  In 2012–13, at least 70 of the 121 FBS 
head football coaches and 35 of the 68 head basketball coaches 
whose teams qualified for the 2014 Final Four were under long 
term contracts making a $1 million or more in annual salaries.84  
These salaries are possible only because of a rigged marketplace, 
which is characterized by a low-pay labor force of athletes (limited 
scholarship awards rather than an open marketplace), budgets 
that are bolstered by non-profit, educational institution general 
funds, student fee subsidies, and inflated revenues due to tax 
benefits available to donors.  Further, expenses continue to rise 
faster than revenues,85 and the entire system is operating below 
normal professional sport business costs because non-profit 
organizations are exempt from taxes.  Other than the prediction of 
an inevitable crash, no one knows exactly what would happen if 
institutions were suddenly faced with any of the following 
 
 83.   D-1 REVENUES & EXPENSES REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.  
 84.   See Steve Berkowitz et al., 2014 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, USA 
TODAY, www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).  
However, no salary information was provided for private institutions.  See id. 
 85.  See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, http:// 
www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).   
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realities: (1) paying basketball and football player salaries; (2) 
paying unemployment insurance and workers compensation; (3) 
loss of tax preferences for donors contributing to the athletic 
department or purchasing tickets tied to seating preferences; or 
(4) NCAA determination of athlete scholarship limits and benefits 
being replaced with collective bargaining with athlete unions. 
The second alternative, and one that would surely be ignited 
if a financial crash were to occur, is congressional intervention.  
Congress could condition receipt of billions of dollars of student 
financial aid and other federal funds distributed via the Higher 
Education Act of 196586 on the reform of the NCAA’s highly 
commercialized athletic programs.  Congress could also establish a 
federally chartered non-profit organization, similar to the United 
States Olympic Committee, to replace the NCAA, and require that 
all higher-education institutions with commercialized, athletic 
programs be members or risk losing Higher Education Act funding 
for noncompliance. Congress, in effect, could force a resetting of 
the educational sport moral compass much like Title IX did for 
women in sports.87  Such congressional action would likely target 
institutions with athletic programs that generate more than $1 
million in annual revenues and require these programs to afford 
specific protections and benefits to student-athletes.  Granted, the 
prospect of congressional action given the current dysfunction of 
that entity would be extraordinary.  However, historically, there 
has been government action when the wellbeing of so many young 
athletes is at stake.  Indeed, the origination of the NCAA in 1906 
was due in part to government pressure to stop football-related 
deaths.88  The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act in 
1978, which established the United States Olympic Committee as 
a federally chartered non-profit organization, addressed the 
 
 86.  20 U.S.C. § 1058 (2012) (defining eligibility to receive funds under 
the Act). 
 87.  Title IX conditions receipt of federal funds on conducting educational 
programs or activities that do not discriminate on the basis of sex.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681 (2012).  This law, which was adopted in 1972, effectively negated close 
to a century of discrimination against women in scholastic and college 
athletic programs.  See generally Cassandra Jones, Book Review, 22 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 613 (2012) (reviewing DEBORAH BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: 
TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS REVOLUTION (2010)). 
 88.  See Bob Green, The president who saved football, CNN (Feb. 5, 2012, 
8:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/05/opinion /greene-super-bowl/. 
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dysfunction of the Amateur Athletic Union and its lack of due 
process and fair treatment for amateur athletes representing the 
United States on our national teams.89  In fact, government 
threats to amend the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports 
Act to reorganize the Board of Directors forced the United States 
Olympic Committee to eliminate its large Board of Directors, 
which at the time consisted of self-interested organizational 
members, and replaced it with a Board consisting primarily of 
independent directors.90 
Congressional action appears to be the only reasonable 
alternative, not only for the aforementioned reasons, but also for a 
number of additional reasons: 
1. Research by the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate 
Athletics has demonstrated that 80% of college FBS 
presidents believe they are unable to control the excesses 
of FBS commercialized sports.91 
2. The NCAA’s historical record of not having demonstrated 
the ability to initiate significant reforms, especially those 
that control commercial excesses and address the 
educational exploitation of academically underprepared 
athletes. 
3. The challenges of reform are so complex, including, 
significantly, requiring FBS institutions to remain a part 
of the larger NCAA community (which could be a 
requirement of congressional action), such that it is 
reasonable to believe that only the threat of loss of federal, 
Higher Education funding will move the needle toward 
meaningful change; and 
4. Only Congress has the power to grant a limited antitrust 
exemption to stop the financial bleeding from antitrust 
lawsuits, and only Congress can give subpoena authority 
to help fix a broken NCAA enforcement system that must 
afford better due process to its members.  Moreover, it is 
 
 89.  See 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (2012). 
 90.  See Reform of the United States Olympic Committee: Hearing Before 
the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. 8–10 (2003) 
(statement of Donald Fehr, Co-Chairman, Indep. Comm. on Reform, U.S. 
Olympic Comm.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108sh 
rg87340/pdf/CHRG-108shrg87340.pdf.  
 91.  KNIGHT COMM., supra note 81, at 25. 
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reasonable to believe that Congress will not grant an 
antitrust exemption or subpoena power without the 
assurance of immediate, meaningful, and sustainable 
reform. 
V. WHAT WOULD MEANINGFUL REFORM LOOK LIKE? 
The author and others,92 believe that the minimum provisions 
of such a congressional bill should address the need for: 
 A limited antitrust exemption for the governance 
organization (either the NCAA or a replacement, federally 
chartered, non-profit organization) that permits the 
national governance organization to control sport 
operating costs, including coaches’ salaries and other 
commercial elements, but conditioned on compliance with 
all reform provisions; 
 Exclusive ownership of national championships by the 
national governance organization (which would preclude 
the current FBS conference ownership of the College 
Football Playoffs) in order to generate revenues to be 
distributed to member institutions so they could provide 
academic, health, and welfare benefits to the greatest 
number of athletes, rather than a select few (i.e., FBS and 
particularly the Big Five conferences); 
 More stringent due process protections for member 
institutions and binding arbitration for student-athletes 
faced with significant loss of privileges or benefits, 
including giving subpoena power and the power to require 
statements under oath to professional judges hired as third 
party contractors to oversee the adjudication of alleged 
serious rule violations; 
 An independent board of directors responsible for 
legislating educational sport conditions for the good of all 
athletes, rather than the commercial interests of a limited 
 
 92.  In 2013–14, a subcommittee of The Drake Group, of which the 
author was a member, developed such a model congressional action.  See 
Collegiate Athletic Association of the United States (Aug. 8, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Roger Williams Univ. Law Review).  
Other members of the subcommittee were Brian Porto, Gerald Gurney, Allen 
Sack, and Andrew Zimbalist.  The remainder of the paper describes the 
congressionally mandated minimum reforms suggested by that group.   
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number of the wealthiest athletic programs (e.g., removal 
of the current commercial athletic program self-interest 
legislative system); 
 Institutional, conference, and national governance 
organization media revenue set-asides to establish an 
academic trust fund dedicated to the provision of long-term 
health and educational benefits to injured athletes and the 
provision of educational assistance to those unable to 
complete their degrees; 
 Freshman ineligibility and mandatory remedial programs 
for specially admitted or other athletes whose high school 
GPA or SAT scores are below one standard deviation from 
the mean academic profile of their entering classes; 
 Caps on sport operating costs, salaries, and wages; 
 Tenured faculty oversight of athlete academic achievement 
and academic counseling and support practices, including 
academic authorities, rather than athletic departments 
controlling tutoring, advising, and other academic support 
programs; 
 Whistle-blower protection for those who report rule 
infractions; 
 Scholarship awards that are guaranteed for five years or 
until graduation and cannot be gradated or terminated 
based on injury, athletic performance, or disciplinary 
measures not applicable to non-athlete students; 
 Specified athlete rights related to medical care, baseline 
neurological testing, preventive health education for life-
threatening conditions, catastrophic injury insurance 
coverage provided by the institution/athletic governance 
organization at no cost to the athlete or athlete’s parents, 
transfer to other institutions without the current athletics 
eligibility penalty, respectful and professional treatment 
by coaches, and licensed physician determination of return 
to play following injuries; 
 Prohibition of construction of athlete-only facilities; 
 Post-season ineligibility for institutions not in compliance 
with Title IX; and 
 Annual reports to Congress open to the general public. 
 
These mandates deserve additional explanation. 
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A. Limited Antitrust Exemption 
As collegiate athletic event media rights revenues rise into 
the stratosphere and the prospect of treble damages under 
antitrust law appeals to contingency lawyers, a national 
governance organization limited antitrust exemption appears to 
be a necessity.  Without it, any national governance organization 
will be unable to fulfill a primary function: control of interstate 
collegiate athletics commerce in order to limit spending on 
athletics.  Any spending limits related to commercial activity (e.g., 
sport operating, or salaries and wages caps, or not permitting 
contests on weekdays) will be challenged. 
Before 1984, the NCAA controlled the number of football 
games that could appear on television during the season.93  
Generally, an NCAA “game of the week” was televised nationally, 
and several games were televised regionally.94  In the early 1980s, 
major football powers began to complain because of viewer 
demand for their games, arguing that they should be able to sell 
their television rights to the highest bidder without interference 
from the NCAA.95  This led to an antitrust lawsuit against the 
NCAA.96  In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the major 
football powers, holding that the NCAA was acting like a classic 
cartel—producers who gather together to control sale, price, or 
production of any product in order to restrain competition.97  In 
the decades following this landmark ruling the number of football 
games on television grew dramatically.  Games are now played on 
just about any night of the week with little regard for the impact 
on athletes’ educations or the thousands of non-athlete students 
skipping classes to attend such contests.  College football and 
basketball began to radically alter schedules to meet the needs of 
the networks.  Universities now jump from one conference to 
another in hopes that such realignment will allow them to 
penetrate new markets.98  Athletes who are now playing during 
 
 93.  See Andrew Zimbalist, Inequality in Intercollegiate Athletics: 
Origins, Trends and Policies, 6 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 5, 6–8 (2013). 
 94.  See id. at 6. 
 95.  See id. at 7. 
 96.  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984). 
 97.  Id. at 95–96, 120. 
 98.  See Ivan Maisel, Conference peace has arrived, ESPN (Feb. 14, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10452933/college-football-realign
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the week have the added burden of long trips to play games across 
the country because of these conference realignments.  Only a 
limited antitrust exemption can allow the national governance 
organization to address such scheduling problems without fear of 
being sued.  Faculty senates also need to address this scheduling 
issue.  What started as a football problem has become a problem 
for all college sports at just about every level. 
The significant legal cost of responding to such lawsuits and 
the multimillion-dollar cost of settling or losing these lawsuits will 
undermine the legislative and financial stability of intercollegiate 
athletics if such a limited exemption is not forthcoming.  Such an 
antitrust exemption can be narrowly crafted to focus on specific 
categories of rules in order to avoid the legal morass of any broad 
“educational purpose” standard that would require court 
interpretation.  Further, the granting of such a limited exemption 
would be conditioned on the adoption and continued enforcement 
of a full slate of reform mandates. 
B. National Governance Organization Ownership of National 
Championships 
Any bill must mandate that the national governance 
organization will own all national championship competitions, and 
the proceeds from such events are to be used to advance the 
health and academic welfare of all student-athletes and all 
member institutions.  In other words, ownership of national 
championships by the national governance organization must 
include the College Football Playoffs, which is currently owned by 
the FBS conferences.  The media and other revenues from any 
national football championship should be used like that of the 
Division I Basketball Final Four revenues, with the bulk of those 
revenues designated for specified athlete benefit purposes and a 
portion used to benefit all NCAA student-athletes, like, for 
example, the NCAA’s catastrophic injury insurance program.99  
The current 4-team FBS playoff, which will yield at least $440 
million annually beginning in 2014–15,100 could and should be 
 
ment-era-ended. 
 99.  See NCAA CATASTROPHIC INSURANCE PROGRAM BENEFIT SUMMARY, 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/14-16%20Cat%20Benefit%20Summary
.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).  
 100.  See Schroeder, supra note 58. 
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used for: 
 The provision of basic injury insurance coverage for all 
450,000 NCAA athletes, rather than the current practice of 
using student and parent policies, at an estimated annual 
cost of $230 to 260 million; 
 Regular review and enhancements to the current 
catastrophic injury policy, an estimated $15 to 20 million 
in annual cost; 
 Subsidies to all Division I institutions that would allow 
them to afford higher cost of attendance athletic 
scholarship limits (using the same federal standards used 
for all students), which would benefit all scholarship 
athletes at every Division I institution instead of just the 
65 Big Five conference members, at an estimated $150 to 
$170 million annual cost; and 
 Hiring and using judges and investigators to preside over 
severe and significant breach of rules cases and other 
NCAA enforcement system due process improvements, 
such as binding arbitration for college athlete appeals, at 
an annual cost of $5 to $6 million.101 
 
This distribution of revenue is focused on benefitting athletes and 
is very different from the current system, under which the Big 
Five conferences are allowed to keep 75% of these proceeds to fuel 
astronomical coaches’ salaries and lavish facility excesses of the 
football and basketball arms race.  It should be noted that the 
FBS institutions retain 100% of all of their non-national 
championship post-season bowl events, conference championships, 
and regular season football television media rights fees.102  FBS 
institutions could continue to retain all of these non-national 
championship event revenues, which could be specifically 
protected as institutional property rights under the provisions of 
such a bill. 
 
 101.  These estimates were developed as part of a working paper by The 
Drake Group.  See Answers to the Most Commonly Asked Questions About 
the Collegiate Athletic Association of the United States Act app. C, at 46–47 
(Sep. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Roger Williams Univ. 
Law Review). 
 102.  See Schroeder, supra note 58. 
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C. Due Process Protections 
The bill could specify more stringent due process 
requirements before suspending a coach, athlete, or other athletics 
personnel from participating in athletics events; suspending the 
institution’s athletics events telecommunications privileges; or 
suspending a member institution from participating in a collegiate 
athletics event.  In severe cases, these processes might include: 
 pre-hearing discovery; 
 confrontation and cross-examination of opposing witnesses; 
 subpoena and statements under oath by third party 
witnesses; 
 binding arbitration of athlete eligibility issues; and 
 provision of an athlete welfare advocate to provide legal 
assistance to athletes facing such penalties. 
The current perceptions of enforcement processes favoring the 
largest athletic programs or conflict of interest in adjudication by 
peer member institutions could be removed by the required use of 
judges and third party investigators.  Subpoena and statements 
under oath by third party witnesses, powers that could be granted 
by Congress, would solve the uncooperative witness issue now 
plaguing an ineffective NCAA enforcement system. 
D. Independent Board of Directors 
Adoption of a fiduciary responsible for the membership as a 
whole and advancing educational sport conditions for the good of 
all athletes, rather than representing the narrow interests of a 
wealthy few, is only possible if members of the Board of Directors 
are not employed or currently serving member institutions and 
not charged with representing a membership subset.  Members 
could be nominated based on their expertise, past experience in 
athletics, and integrity. 
E. Academic Trust Fund 
The bill could also include a mandate that 5% or some 
designated amount of all media revenues derived from 
institutional, conference, and national governance organization 
athletic events be set aside to fund an Academic Trust Fund—
providing assistance with degree completion, graduate program, 
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or other educational benefits to student-athletes.  An Academic 
Trust Fund is a sensible way to provide benefits beyond athletic 
scholarships and a sound alternative to paying players to 
participate in athletics.  Former athletes could apply for and 
justify requests for funding, rather than institutions making a 
blanket promise that sends the message: Don’t worry about 
studying now.  Focus on athletics, and we’ll make sure you can 
complete your degree later. 
F. Freshman Ineligibility and Required Remediation of 
Underprepared Athletes 
Particularly in Division I, but in other competitive divisions 
as well, coaches knowingly recruit high-academic-risk athletes 
into highly competitive academic environments.  When they do so, 
huge pressures are created for underprepared students to be 
steered into the easiest majors and courses.  Further, a college 
athlete recruited into such a situation faces an uphill battle to 
maintain self-esteem and remain academically eligible. 
If an incoming recruit falls one standard deviation below the 
high school grade point average or standardized test scores of an 
institution’s incoming class, this is a good predictor of future 
academic difficulty or ineligibility.  Athletes in such challenging 
situations should become established academically before being 
allowed to participate in athletics, and institutions should be 
required to provide academic support programs to assist them in 
overcoming identified academic deficiencies during that pivotal 
first year.  Retention studies on both athletes and students who 
are not athletes repeatedly demonstrate the importance of the 
first year of college.103  Further, the at-risk athlete should not be 
under the same time demands as an athlete who is eligible to 
participate.  Thus, a requirement limiting athletic participation to 
10-hours per-week of athletics practice is justifiable.  The at-risk 
athlete would not be “penalized” for this forced academic redshirt 
year in that he or she would be eligible for athletics financial aid 
and limited practice and will still have four years of athletics 
eligibility and financial aid remaining.  The one-year of residency 
in such circumstances is an investment in the athlete’s future 
 
 103.  See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE BOTTOM LINE: OBSERVATION AND 
ARGUMENTS ON THE SPORT BUSINESS 233–34 (2006). 
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academic success.  The issue is not whether academically at-risk 
athletes are admitted.  The issue is one of exploitation.  If the 
institution provides remediation and fulfills the promise of a 
college education, there can be no allegation of exploitation.  If the 
institution knowingly admits an underprepared student and fails 
to remediate and provide a college education, allowing that 
student to play a sport whose success benefits the institution, it 
can be justifiably said that he or she is being exploited. 
The standard-deviation methodology is tied to the academic 
profile of each NCAA member institution.  Thus, an athlete with 
poor high school academic performance or low standardized test 
grades may be immediately eligible if he or she matches up (is 
within one standard deviation) with an institution’s general 
student body profile.  Such an approach would reinforce sound 
admissions practices by promoting consideration of the athlete’s 
academic fit.  Recruited athletes may opt for institutions that offer 
a better fit and increased chances of academic success. 
G. Caps on Athletic Program Expenditures 
Current NCAA membership division criteria focuses primarily 
on minimum conditions and sets no expenditure ceilings except for 
athlete scholarships, inviting an unlimited expenditure “arms 
race.”  Athletic program operating expenses can be capped, and 
such caps can accommodate flexibility regarding team travel.  
Costs can be further limited with more stringent limits on the 
number of contests and length of playing seasons.  Salaries and 
wages of coaches and administrative personnel could be capped 
commensurate with non-profit, educational marketplace practices.  
For instance, there could be a rule limiting coach compensation to 
no more than two or three times the 95th percentile salaries of full 
professors at doctoral institutions.  Coupled with stringent 
definitions limiting the numbers of head and assistant coaches 
and other support personnel, the practice of highly excessive 
salaries could be brought under control.  Something is very wrong 
with the system when in 40 of the 50 states, the highest paid 
public employee is a head athletics coach.104 
 
 104.  See Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: Is Your State’s Highest Paid 
Employee a Coach? (Probably), DEADSPIN (May 9, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://dead 
spin.com/infographic-is-your-states-highest-paid-employee-a-co-489635228. 
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It should be noted that current compensation for coaches and 
athletic directors is the result of a rigged marketplace.  Coaches 
reap extraordinary salaries because there is no paid labor force—
no athlete employees—yet, they maintain that they should be 
treated as if they operate in the professional, sports marketplace.  
They actually operate in a non-profit, educational environment in 
which salaries are lower than in the for-profit world. 
Further, the number of professional sports teams is limited; 
therefore, competition for coaches is also limited.  Higher 
education has created an artificial environment that has no 
comparator in the commercial marketplace.  Andrew Zimbalist, 
noted sport economist, has criticized this manufactured “economic 
rent”—the portion of a coach’s salary in excess of  what is needed 
to keep a coach employed in a rigged market: 
 Consider the multimillion-dollar compensation 
packages offered to dozens of college football and 
basketball coaches.  There are thirty-two NFL and thirty 
NBA head coaching jobs.  These jobs are already taken.  
What would be the most remunerative alternative 
employment [for these college coaches if they did not 
coach at these universities] . . . for argument’s sake, 
suppose there was an NCAA rule stipulating that no head 
coach could be paid more than the university president at 
the school.  Would [these coaches] find another job that 
paid them more than $500,000?  Probably not. 
. . . I don’t begrudge people seeking whatever the market 
will pay them.  But given that (1) the market for college 
coaches is rigged by tax exemptions, subsidies, etc.; (2) 
paying the coach more than the school president sends 
the wrong message about a university’s priorities; (3) the 
star athletes on the basketball and football teams are not 
allowed to receive cash salaries; and (4) resource 
allocation would not be affected by a salary-limit rule for 
coaches, it would make eminent sense for the NCAA to 
pass such a rule limiting head coach compensation. 
 The solution seems straightforward, but there are two 
significant impediments.  First, its elevated rhetoric 
notwithstanding, the NCAA basically functions as a trade 
association of athletics directors and coaches.  Why would 
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they vote to reduce their own compensation? 
 Second, such a rule would require Congress to pass an 
antitrust exemption for this market restriction.  I can 
think of no good reason why Congress would not 
cooperate on this, if asked by the NCAA.  There’s the 
Catch 22.105 
 
When former private business workers choose to become 
higher education faculty or private attorneys choose to work as 
public defenders (another non-profit environment), they willingly 
accept compensation a commensurate with that of public servants.  
Many expert faculty members can make much more as full-time 
consultants, and many public defenders can make much more in 
private practice.  Coaches can also do so if they can access the 
small number of high paying jobs that are available each year in 
professional football and basketball.  This is always an option for 
coaches.  But choosing to work in higher education should mean 
foregoing professional coaching salaries. 
H. Tenured Faculty Oversight of Academic Matters 
One of the National Labor Relations Board criteria for 
determining whether Northwestern University football players 
were paid employees was supervision by academic faculty.106  
Establishing a tenured faculty athletics oversight committee 
elected by the institution’s highest faculty governing body would 
resolve this concern. 
In higher education, the faculty is ultimately responsible for 
the academic integrity of the institution.  The national athletic 
governance organization should have a requirement for such 
oversight.  The NCAA does not currently have such a 
requirement.  If an institution voluntarily has an athletics council 
or committee, though, the NCAA requires that a majority of its 
members be administrators or faculty members.107  Yet, such 
committees do not have responsibilities that specify the 
mechanisms of oversight or accountability, and faculty 
 
 105.  ZIMBALIST, supra note 103, at 282. 
 106.  Nw. Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1922054, at *19 (N.L.R.B. 
Mar. 26, 2014). 
 107.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 6.1.2.1, at 41. 
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appointments are usually made by the president with the 
approval of the athletic director in order to ensure that strong 
athletic supporters occupy these positions.108  Requiring a higher 
education institution to have a tenured faculty-only committee 
elected by the highest faculty governance entity at the institution, 
mandating that such a committee produce an annual report from 
that committee to the institution’s faculty senate, and assigning 
this group specific committee oversight activities would reduce the 
possibility of academic fraud by athletic programs.  This oversight 
committee should be charged with tasks like regularly examining 
the academic progress and qualifications of athletes, comparing 
average SAT and ACT scores and Federal Graduation Rates by 
sport with average scores for the student body, reporting 
graduation success rates, examining athlete registration in 
independent studies and their average grade assigned, compiling 
admissions profiles of athletes compared to the student body, 
tracking athletes’ progress toward a degree, and examining trends 
in selected majors by sport.  This data represents areas in which 
athletic programs have experienced integrity violations in the 
past.109  This oversight mechanism would guarantee the level of 
transparency necessary to identify integrity concerns. 
I. Whistle-blower Protection 
It has been an embarrassment to higher education to watch 
the “shooting of the messenger” in cases of clear academic fraud.  
For example, the University of North Carolina’s (“UNC”) tutoring 
improprieties, failure to report student-athlete plagiarism, and 
bogus classes (20% of all students enrolled in independent studies 
at UNC were athletes) were well documented.110  The learning 
specialist in the athletic department’s academic support program 
who reported the violations was dismissed from that position.111  
Yet, the NCAA has no rule that prohibits retaliation against those 
 
 108.  See id. (providing for only a majority by generally-defined 
administrators and requiring an administrator or faculty as chair). 
 109.  See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, In Fake Classes Scandal, UNC Fails Its 
Athletes—and Whistle-Blower, BLOOMSBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-02-27/in-fake-classes-scandal-unc
-fails-its-athletes-whistle-blower. 
 110.  See id. 
 111.  See, e.g., id.  
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who report rule violations or unethical conduct.  Reform attempts 
should address this vacancy by providing some level of protection 
for individuals who report infractions. 
J. Athletic Scholarship Guarantees 
Multiyear scholarships that cannot be gradated or canceled on 
the basis of athletic ability, performance, or contribution to team 
success clearly indicate that the athlete is not being paid for his or 
her athletic performance.  Rather the athlete, in recognition of 
extraordinary athletic skill, is being awarded a college education.  
The relationship between coaches and athletes would no longer be 
perceived as a contractual quid pro quo, thus helping the national 
governance organization retain a clear line of demarcation 
between collegiate and professional sports.  Universities would 
signal that players they recruit are valued as students first, 
regardless of performance on the athletic field.  Because coaches 
would have to work with their “recruiting mistakes,” these 
athletes would have a chance to mature into players who can 
contribute to team success and, perhaps, get significant playing 
time.  Besides raising graduation rates, these scholarships would 
allow athletes to become an integral part of the student body and 
benefit from the human capital often associated with a prestigious 
university.  No court in the country would mistake a college 
athlete on scholarship for a university employee, thus significantly 
cutting the time and money the national association spends on 
antitrust lawsuits or challenging adverse decisions by the 
National Labor Relations Board. 
K. Athlete Rights 
The power imbalance between young athletes and their 
coaches and athletic administrators is significant.  Thus, it is 
critical that the national governance organization Board of 
Directors be specifically charged with promulgating and enforcing 
regulations in the area of protecting the basic health, freedom, 
and welfare rights of athletes.  At a minimum, athletes should 
have the right to: 
1. Transfer to another institution without athletic 
participation ineligibility or other penalty, at least once 
during that athlete’s undergraduate enrollment and 
conditioned on that athlete meeting all academic and 
LOPIANOFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/27/2015  11:09 AM 
2015] FIXING ENFORCEMENT AND DUE PROCESS 283 
athletic participation eligibility requirements at the 
current institution at the time of transfer; 
2. Receiving institutionally financed prevention education 
and baseline and/or monitoring assessments for sports-
related injuries and risks (e.g., neurological baseline 
assessments related to concussion, presence of sickle cell 
trait, review of susceptibility to dehydration, etc.), for those 
athletes predisposed to injury risk due to the nature of 
their sports participation, as recommended by the 
American College of Sports Medicine, the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, or other national 
associations of specialist physicians. 
3. Receive athletic program adopted exercise and supervision 
guidelines to identify potentially life-threatening health 
conditions (such as in the case of sickle cell trait, 
susceptibility to heat or cold related illness, or 
dehydration); 
4. Receive licensed physician determination for return-to-
play following any injury or other medical decision 
affecting the athlete’s safe participation; 
5. Receive initial and continuing treatment for any injury 
directly resulting from participation in his or her 
institution’s athletic program at no cost to college athletes 
or their parents with such requirement not applicable to 
any preexisting medical condition that predates the 
athlete’s participation in the institution’s athletic program; 
6. Be treated with respect and protected from sexual or 
professional relationship misconduct, physical, verbal, or 
mental abuse, and other pedagogy practices that endanger 
their health and welfare; 
7. Report any alleged misconduct by a coach, athletics 
personnel, or another athlete to a non-athletics 
institutional employee with an assurance of “whistle 
blower protection;” and 
8. Receive stringent due process protections. 
 
L. Prohibition of Construction of Athlete-Only Facilities 
No small subset of the student body should receive the 
extraordinary privilege of exclusive access to university facilities, 
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whether they are paid for by athletics revenues or private 
donations.  It is particularly irresponsible in the current economic 
climate to engage in such practices.  Numerous institutions use 
public bonds to finance such athletic department projects.112  
Despite the fact that NCAA rules have long prohibited exclusive 
housing units for athletes,113 no rules prohibit the construction of 
facilities used only by athletes, which has led to extravagances 
such as: 
 The (Oregon) Ducks’ Football Performance Center is a 
145,000 square-foot building that cost a reported $68 
million.114  Amenities include a lobby with 64 55-inch 
televisions that can combine to show one image, a weight 
room floor made of Brazilian hardwood, custom foosball 
tables where one team is Oregon and the other team has 
11 players each representing the rest of the Pac-12, a 
barber shop, and a coaches’ locker room with TVs 
embedded in the mirrors.115  Athletes already had access 
to an indoor practice field, an athletic medical center, a 
brand-new basketball arena, and an academic study center 
for athletes.116  Oregon’s new football program complex 
contains, among other things, movie theaters, an Oregon 
football museum, a players’ lounge and deck, a dining hall, 
and private classrooms for top players.117 
 Athletic-only practice facilities at West Virginia 
University, utilized only by the Mountaineer men’s and 
women’s programs, allows Mountaineer basketball players 
 
 112.  See Kristi Dosh, Multiple ways to finance college stadiums, ESPN 
(June 14, 2014, 11:08 AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/ 
id/743/multiple-ways-to-finance-college-stadiums. 
 113.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 16.5.1, at 214. 
 114.  See Tony Manfred, Oregon’s New $68 Million Football Facility is like 
Nothing We’ve Ever Seen in College Sports, BUS. INSIDER (July 31, 2013, 10:41 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/new-oregon-football-building-photos-
2013-7. 
 115.  See id; see also Dan Greenspan, Oregon unveils eye-popping new 
Football Performance Center, NFL (Jul. 31, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://www. 
nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000224020/article/oregon-unveils-eyepopping-new
-football-performance-center (last modified Aug. 2, 2013, 2:52 PM). 
 116.  See Steven Davis, University of Oregon Athletics Unveils Latest 
Technology in Facility Makeover, SPORT TECHIE (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.sporttechie.com/2012/07/26/university-of-oregon-170/. 
 117.  See id.; see also Casanova Center, GO DUCKS, http://www.goducks. 
com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=205174793 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
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to have access to the best performance training tools 
available, top tier practice areas, strength and conditioning 
space, sports medicine needs, team meeting and video 
rooms, and facility equipment.118  Adding all the elements 
of performance training and providing first class locker 
room facilities, player’s lounges, and study areas, the 
basketball practice facility provides a distinct advantage in 
recruiting top tier student-athletes and showcasing the 
best Mountaineer Basketball and WVU can offer.119 
 The Texas A&M University football players’ lounge and 
academic center is 5,000-square feet and conveniently 
located one floor above the locker room, training room, and 
meeting rooms, and is across the hall from the new state-
of-the-art, athletic-only academic center.120  It is outfitted 
with ample leather seating, tables, and oversized leather 
lounge chairs that recline to a full prone position so players 
can watch the huge widescreen high-definition 
television.121  Other activities include ping-pong, foosball, 
pool, and gaming tables, as well as several arcade-style 
gaming stations that feature the latest video game 
systems.122  Several flat-screen TVs are mounted in each 
corner of the room.123  Immediately to the left of the 
lounge’s entrance is a marble-top bar that contains soft 
drink and candy machines for the players’ use.124 
 
Academic support facilities for athletes are often of higher 
quality than those available to the student body.  Weight training 
facilities are often larger and include higher quality equipment 
than what are available to the student body.  Gymnasia or fields 
that are used only for basketball or team practices and left unused 
for the majority of the day should be unacceptable, especially in 
the current stressful economic environment for higher education.  
 
 118.  See Basketball Practice Facility, W. VA. MOUNTAINEERS, 
http://www.wvusports.com/page.cfm?section=18089 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
 119.  See id. 
 120.  See Bright Football Complex, TEXAS A&M, http://www.12thman.com/ 
ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209603262 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
 121.  See id. 
 122.  See id. 
 123.  See id. 
 124.  See id. 
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Such issues are not only a matter of excessive expense, but also a 
matter of impropriety as a relatively small percentage of the 
overall student body participates in athletics. 
Further, facilities and practices should not isolate athletes 
from the rest of the student body.  Athletes can be provided with 
nutrition education and, if necessary, even be provided with 
unlimited meal cards at student dining facilities.  They do not 
need or benefit from a separate eating facility, game rooms, or 
lounges. 
VI. INELIGIBILITY FOR POST-SEASON PLAY IF NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH 
TITLE IX 
Over forty years have passed since the adoption of Title IX, 
yet many collegiate athletic programs are still not in compliance 
with this federal law.125  Lack of Title IX compliance and data 
revealing backsliding in participation and other benefits is 
disturbing.  A recent NCAA report revealed: 
 Intercollegiate athletic participation levels are at all-time 
highs, but these participation rates are increasing faster 
for men than for women at both high schools and 
colleges.126  Since 2001–02, men have gained 5,526 more 
intercollegiate opportunities than women.127 
 Division I has the best participation rate for women, but at 
54% male student-athletes and 46% female student-
athletes, D-I is still 7% away from mirroring the 
undergraduate female population.128  D-II has a 17% 
difference between female athletes and undergraduates, 
while D-III has a 14% gap.129 
 In 2010–11, women had a net gain of 113 intercollegiate 
teams, and men experienced a net gain of 112 teams.130  
But more women’s teams (69) than men’s (59) were 
 
 125.  See NATIONAL COALITION FOR GIRLS & WOMEN IN EDUCATION, TITLE 
IX: WORKING TO ENSURE GENDER EQUITY IN EDUCATION 7–8 (2012), available 
at http://www.ncwge.org/ PDF/TitleIXat40.pdf. 
 126.  AMY WILSON, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
AS TITLE IX TURNS 40 6 (2012), available at http://www.ncaa 
publications.com/DownloadPublication.aspx?download=TITLEIX.pdf. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 7. 
 130.  Id. at 10. 
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dropped, a disturbing development because women 
continue to be underrepresented in intercollegiate 
athletics.131 
 Division I has the greatest gap in expenditures between 
men’s and women’s athletic programs.132  Analysis of 
median expenses indicates that FBS institutions are 
spending 2.5 times more on their men’s programs than on 
their women’s programs.133 
 Spending on men’s sports still exceeds that of women’s 
sports by a considerable amount: a 20% difference in 
median expenses at D-I, 14% in D-II, and 16% in D-III.134 
 From 2006 to 2010, all Divisions showed a greater increase 
in spending on men’s athletic programs than women’s, 
most noticeably at FBS universities where expenditures 
increased by over $5 million for men and by just under $2 
million for women.135 
 2010 NCAA figures indicate that D-I spends more on each 
male student-athlete than each female student-athlete: 
over $30,000 more at FBS; $3,000 more at FCS; and $1,000 
more at D-I institutions without football.136  In contrast, 
the most recent available data for D-II and D-III schools 
show slightly higher expenditures for each female student-
athlete, a result affected by the male advantage in 
participation opportunities.137 
 Since Title IX was passed, the number of female head 
coaches and female athletics directors (“AD”) has steadily 
declined.138  Over the past decade, the percentage of 
female coaches of women’s teams has leveled off at around 
40, and since 1980, the percentage of female ADs has 
remained around 20.139 
 Women hold only around 20% of all NCAA head coaching, 
 
 131.  Id.   
 132.  Id. at 12. 
 133.  Id. at 14. 
 134.  Id. at 12–14. 
 135.  Id. at 15. 
 136.  Id. at 16. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 17, 19. 
 139.  Id. 
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AD, and conference commissioner positions.140 
 In 2010–11, women occupied 34% of Associate AD and 
Assistant AD positions, and more men (51%) than women 
(49%) were assistant coaches for women’s teams.141 
 Men are now coaching female student-athletes in great 
numbers, but women have experienced meager increases 
in opportunities to coach men.142  The most recent figures 
indicate that only 4% of head coaches for men’s teams are 
women.143 
The federal penalty for non-compliance with Title IX is 
removal of all federal funds from the institution,144  but this 
penalty has never been levied because it is simply too onerous.  
Instead, the Office of Civil Rights has negotiated resolution 
agreements in response to complaints.145  Unfortunately, the 
Office of Civil Rights does not have the resources to oversee 
athletics compliance at 4,500 institutions of higher education146 
and over 26,000 high schools.147  The national athletic governance 
organization, however, has the power to enforce its own rules.  It 
 
 140.  Id. at 26. 
 141.  Id. 18, 21, 23. 
 142.  Id. at 17. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012). 
 145.  See Office of Civil Rights, Title IX: Sexual Harassment: Tufts 
University (01-10-2089), U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/01102089.html (last modified July 25, 
2014); Office of Civil Rights, Title IX: Interscholastic Athletics: Wake County 
Public School System (NC) (11-11-1040); Houston Independent School District 
(TX) (06-11-1061); see also Columbus City Schools (OH) (15-11-1036); Deer 
Valley Unified School District (AZ) (08-11-1030), K., 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/doc s/investigations/20120701.html 
(last modified Oct. 5, 2012); Office of Civil Rights, Title IX: Sexual 
Harassment: Yale University (CT): (01-11-2027), U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs /investigations/01112027.html 
(last modified Nov. 19, 2012).  The Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) undertook 
each of these investigations in response to Title IX violations.  In each case, 
either during or at the conclusion of the OCR’s investigation, a resolution 
agreement was reached requiring the offending institution to implement 
measures to correct its violations. 
 146.  See FAST FACTS: Educational Institutions, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=84 (last visited Jan. 3, 
2015). 
 147.  See High School Facts at a Glance, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ovae/pi/hs/hsfacts.html (last modified 
June 18, 2014). 
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is reasonable to condition membership in the national athletic 
governance organization and eligibility for post-season 
championships on compliance with federal gender equity 
requirements, just as an athletic association may require a 
minimum annual progress rate for post-season eligibility.148  This 
post-season eligibility gender equity stance is particularly 
appropriate when a national athletic governance organization, 
such as the NCAA, has adopted gender equity as a “guiding 
principle.”149  Attaching eligibility for post-season championships 
to the national association commitment to gender equity is 
stronger than merely voicing words. 
Just as the NCAA requires review of rule compliance once 
every four years by entities outside the institution,150 with 
athletic conferences often performing this service, it is reasonable 
to assume that a similar mechanism can be used for Title IX.  As 
an illustration, high schools in Kentucky have been subject to such 
a provision, namely, post-season ineligibility and compliance 
review by the state high school athletic association, since 2001.151  
Further, it is appropriate for Congress to insist on compliance 
with federal laws as a condition of granting a limited antitrust 
exemption and continued tax preferences. 
A. Annual Reports to Congress and the Public 
The strongest impetus for accountability in the conduct of 
athletic programs is transparency.  Congress could require that an 
annual report be transmitted simultaneously to the President, to 
 
 148.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 18.4.2.2.2, at 309. 
 149.  Id. arts. 2.3.1–.3, at 3 (“2.3 The Principle of Gender Equity. [*] 2.3.1 
Compliance with Federal and State Legislation. [*] It is the responsibility of 
each member institution to comply with federal and state laws regarding 
gender equity. (Adopted: 1/11/94). 2.3.2 NCAA Legislation. [*] The 
Association should not adopt legislation that would prevent member 
institutions from complying with applicable gender-equity laws, and should 
adopt legislation to enhance member institutions’ compliance with applicable 
gender-equity laws. (Adopted: 1/11/94).  2.3.3 Gender Bias. [*] The activities 
of the Association should be conducted in a manner free of gender bias. 
(Adopted: 1/11/94)”); D-II MANUAL, supra note 29, arts. 2.3.1–.3, at 4 (same); 
D-III MANUAL, supra note 35, arts. 2.3.1–.3, at 4 (same). 
 150.  D-1 MANUAL, supra note 6, art. 22.2.1.2, at 380. 
 151.  See KENTUCKY HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASS’N, HANDBOOK 115–16 
(2009–10), available at www.khsaa.org/httpdocs/titleix/titleixpolicies.pdf 
(outlining Kentucky’s Title IX policy). 
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each House of Congress, and posted on the national athletic 
governance organization’s web site.  Such a report should contain 
the following data: 
1. Audited financial data of each member institution’s 
athletic program to include: 
 student fee revenues 
 direct institutional support 
 indirect institutional support 
 direct governmental support 
 net generated revenues or negative net revenue, 
whichever is applicable 
 net sport operating expenses 
 total salaries, wages, and benefits 
 percentage of operating budget devoted to coaching 
and administrative salaries 
 salaries, wages, and benefits paid to the top five 
employees by position 
 capital construction and other debt service 
 the department’s total outstanding debt 
 revenues from media rights fees 
 academic trust fund transfers and expenditures 
 
2. Audited academic data of each member institution’s 
athletic program to include: 
 federal graduation rate for all students overall, all 
athletes overall, and athletes by sport 
 number of recruited freshmen or transfer athletes 
whose average high school GPA or SAT scores falls 
more than one standard deviation below that of 
his/her entering class 
 institutions ineligible for national championships 
due to (a) deficiencies in academic performance, (b) 
non-compliance with Title IX, or (c) disciplinary or 
other reasons 
 
3. Financial data for the national association that separately 
shows: 
 funds expended for direct support of college athlete 
benefits (e.g., college athlete assistance programs, 
athletics injury insurance or medical subsidies, 
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catastrophic injury insurance, Academic Trust 
Fund, etc.) 
 aggregated amount distributed to member 
institutions by purpose 
 amount of direct distribution of national 
association funds to each member institution 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
The evidence is clear and compelling.  Members of the NCAA 
have lost control of Division I sport commercialism due to changes 
that were allowed in the NCAA governance structure that gave 
legislative control to the institutions with the most 
commercialized athletic programs.  The blame for increasingly 
unregulated and commercialized Division I sport is a direct result 
of a small number of the most powerful and successful athletic 
programs bullying a much larger NCAA membership to succumb 
to their legislative wishes by using the threat of leaving the 
organization.  Given the current Division I FBS controlled 
structure of the NCAA, only action by Congress using the 
penalties of higher education institutions’ loss of federal, Higher 
Education Act funding or tax preferences and the incentive of a 
limited antitrust exemption can produce sustainable reform.  It is 
time for Congress to act. 
 
